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A NARROWING OF SECTION 1983 CLAIMS: 
HOW GONZAGA HAS LIMITED RECOVERY 
FOR VICTIMS OF LEAD POISONING IN 
FEDERAL COURT 
ANNA SNOOK* 
Abstract: Dellita Johnson brought a claim against the City of Detroit on be-
half of her minor son, asserting that her son sustained lead poisoning from the 
public housing unit in which they lived. She brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for the deprivation of federal rights created under provisions of the 
United States Housing Act, the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 
and administrative regulations created under those statutes. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal 
of Ms. Johnson’s claims, holding that the applicable provisions of the United 
States Housing and the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act do not 
contain rights-creating language sufficient to bring a § 1983 claim. The court 
also held that regulations promulgated pursuant to the statutes could not create 
enforceable rights on their own for purposes of § 1983. This comment argues 
that based on the Gonzaga v. Doe precedent, the Sixth Circuit reached the cor-
rect legal conclusion; however, Gonzaga has far-reaching negative implica-
tions on the individuals for whom these statutes were designed to protect. 
INTRODUCTION 
Lead poisoning can cause serious health problems when lead builds up 
in the body over a period of time.1 Often, symptoms are not detected until 
dangerous amounts of lead accumulate in the body.2 Lead-based paint is one 
of the most common and hazardous sources of lead poisoning for children, 
and for young children it can severely affect mental and physical develop-
ment, IQ, ability to pay attention, and academic performance.3 At high lev-
els, lead poisoning can even be fatal.4 Young children are more likely to be 
exposed to lead because they often put their hands, which may be contami-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 Lead Poisoning Definition, MAYO CLINIC (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/lead-poisoning/basics/definition/con-20035487 [https://perma.cc/8U9E-CRZV]. 
 2 Lead Poisoning Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/lead-poisoning/basics/symptoms/con-20035487 [https://perma.cc/RNF5-RS6U]. 
 3 See Lead Poisoning Definition, supra note 1; Lead Prevention Tips, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION (June 19, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/tips.htm [https://perma.
cc/V96U-BSBP]. 
 4 Lead Poisoning Definition, supra note 1. 
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nated with lead dust from the breakdown of lead paint, in their mouths and 
they may even chew paint chips.5 In addition to increased exposure, the 
bodies of young children absorb lead more easily and sustain more harm 
from it than the bodies of older children and adults.6 
According to advertising campaigns for lead paint, lead was added to 
paint to make it more durable.7 Congress banned the use of lead in residen-
tial paint in 1978, but about two-thirds of existing American housing units 
were built before the ban.8 Notably, about one-third of American housing 
units were built prior to 1960, when lead concentrations in paint were the 
highest.9 Of those homes built before 1960, the U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (“HUD”) estimates that seventy-eight percent 
contain lead-based paint and fifty-eight percent have significant lead-based 
paint hazards.10 Today, approximately four million households expose the 
families and children living in them to high levels of lead.11 
In Johnson v. City of Detroit, Dellita Johnson brought claims against 
the City of Detroit and the Detroit Housing Commission on behalf of her 
minor son alleging that the City violated the Lead Based Paint Poisoning 
Prevention Act (“LBPPPA”), the United States Housing Act (“USHA”), and 
their implementing regulations.12 In particular, she claimed that her son sus-
tained lead-poisoning from the paint in their living unit, a public housing 
project.13 Ms. Johnson argued that, among other injuries, her son sustained 
severely painful and disabling injuries that necessitated medical care, men-
                                                                                                                           
 5 Impacts of Lead Poisoning on Low-Income and Minority Communities: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102d Cong. 40 (1992) 
[hereinafter Lead Poisoning Hearing] (statement of Fred Krupp, Executive Director, Environmental 
Defense Fund); Lead Poisoning Risk Factors, MAYO CLINIC (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.
mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/lead-poisoning/basics/risk-factors/con-20035487 [https://perma.
cc/YY94-3BEW].  
 6 Lead Poisoning Risk Factors, supra note 5. 
 7 Lead Poisoning Hearing, supra note 5, at 41. The most common source of lead poisoning 
for children was in the home or “residential environment,” particularly in older housing. PRESI-
DENT’S TASK FORCE ON EVTL. HEALTH RISKS & SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN, ELIMINATING 
CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD PAINT HAZARDS 2, 12–
13 (2000), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/about/fedstrategy2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/96LJ-B8ML]. 
 8 Greg Spiegel, Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 483, 484 
(2004). The housing data provided is from the 2000 census. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DEFI-
NITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 3 (2016), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/definitions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GKK5-UTSN]. The U.S. Census Bureau defines a “housing unit” as a “house, 
apartment, group of rooms, or a single room occupied or intended for occupancy as separate living 
quarters.” Id. 
 9 Spiegel, supra note 8. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Lead, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.cdc.gov/
nceh/lead/default.htm [https://perma.cc/GT8J-WAA6]. 
 12 Johnson v. City of Detroit (Johnson II), 446 F.3d 614, 616–17 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 13 Id. at 617. 
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tal and psychological distress, behavioral difficulties, and permanent and 
irreversible brain damage.14 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan dismissed Johnson’s claims, and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed with no further appeal by 
Ms. Johnson.15 This Comment argues that although the Sixth Circuit made 
the correct legal decision based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gon-
zaga University v. Doe, Johnson demonstrates the far-reaching negative 
implications of Gonzaga and the effect its precedent has on plaintiffs seek-
ing environmental justice in the federal courts.16 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
From 1988 until 1992, Dellita Johnson (“Plaintiff”) and her son, Jerome 
Johnson, lived at Jeffries Homes, a public housing project in Detroit, Michi-
gan.17 During that time, the public housing project was owned and managed 
by the City of Detroit Housing Commission and the City of Detroit (together, 
“the defendants”).18 The Detroit Housing Commission (“DHC”) is a depart-
ment of the City of Detroit (“the City”), and the City and the DHC receive 
federal funding from the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development for 
the operation and management of the Jeffries Homes facility pursuant to Sec-
tion 8 of the USHA.19 
Dellita Johnson filed this case against the City and the DHC on behalf 
of her seventeen-year-old minor son, Jerome Johnson, for injuries she al-
leged were caused by lead-based paint poisoning that he suffered while liv-
ing at Jeffries Homes.20 Jerome was diagnosed with lead poisoning when he 
was two years old.21 Ms. Johnson asserted that her living unit at the Jeffries 
Homes contained peeling, chipping, and flaking paint, and she complained 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Complaint at 13–14, Johnson v. City of Detroit, 319 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Mich. 2004) 
(No. 03-74440). 
 15 Johnson II, 446 F.3d at 616–17. 
 16 See id. at 619, 623, 627; Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002); see also MARY 
FRANCES BERRY ET AL., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT IN MY BACKYARD: EXECUTIVE 
ORDER 12,898 AND TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 85, 94 (2003), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/envjust/ej0104.pdf [https://perma.cc/E73W-H55R] (discussing the effect 
that Gonzaga has on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims). 
 17 Johnson v. City of Detroit (Johnson I), 319 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2004), aff’d, 
446 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. Section 8 of the United States Housing Act (“USHA”) allows for assistance payments to 
be made to owners of existing dwelling units “for the purpose of aiding lower-income families in 
obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(a) (2012). 
 20 Johnson I, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
 21 Id. 
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to Defendants’ agents and employees about these issues.22 Despite her com-
plaints, she alleged that the Defendants failed to remedy the problem by 
repainting or repairing the living unit, or performing any lead inspections or 
risk assessments in the unit.23 
The August 27, 2003 complaint alleged seven claims: (1) a cause of 
action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of federal 
rights created under provisions of the USHA, the LBPPPA, and administra-
tive regulations created pursuant to these statutes; (2) “other violations of 
federal law” based on the same statutory and regulatory framework; (3) vio-
lation of an implied private right of action under the LBPPPA; (4) breach of 
the annual contributions contract (“ACC”) executed between HUD and the 
DHC, as a third-party beneficiary; (5) violation of breach of the warranty of 
habitability; (6) common law negligence claim; and (7) nuisance per se.24 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.25 On May 24, 2004, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued granted defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss with regard to the first three claims, and dismissed 
outright the remaining supplemental state law claims for lack of jurisdic-
tion.26 On June 8, 2004, Ms. Johnson filed a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment, but the district court submitted an order on June 21, 2004 deny-
ing these motions.27 Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on June 24, 
2004, to appeal both the judgment granting in part the motion to dismiss 
and the order denying plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend.28 The Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals then reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo 
and affirmed the decision of the District Court.29 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 759. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Johnson II, 446 F.3d at 617. 
 26 Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed issues 
one and two because the relevant USHA and Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act 
(“LBPPPA”) provisions, as well as the cited regulations, did not create rights enforceable under 
§ 1983. Johnson I, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 781. The court dismissed the third claim because the LBPP-
PA did not create an implied private right of action. Id. Finally, the court dismissed the supple-
mental state law claims because after the federal claims were dismissed, the only remaining claims 
were state law claims, which the court did not have independent original jurisdiction over. Id. The 
court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, but the court has discre-
tion whether to do so. Id. The court decided not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state 
law claims because the state law claims would require analysis under Michigan law, a task best 
handled by Michigan state courts. Id.  
 27 Johnson II, 446 F.3d at 617. 
 28 Id. at 618. 
 29 Id. at 617–18, 629. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (“LBPPPA”) was en-
acted in 1971, and it required the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare to prohibit lead-based paint in residential structures constructed or re-
habilitated by the federal government, or that receive federal assistance.30 In 
1973, an amendment to the LBPPPA was amended so that the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) was required to eradicate 
lead based paint in certain housing that was federally owned, funded by 
federal subsidies, or covered by federal mortgage insurance.31 
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 4821 requires the Secretary of HUD, along 
with the Secretary of Health and Urban Development, to implement a 
demonstration and research program in urban areas in order to determine 
the scope of the lead-based paint poisoning problem.32 This statutory re-
quirement specifically seeks ways that lead-based paint hazards can be re-
moved from interior surfaces, porches, and exterior surfaces of residential 
housing to which children may be exposed.33 Section 4821 further requires 
the Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission to determine the 
safe level of lead in residential paint products by conducting research on 
dried paint film containing different lead compounds that are commonly 
used.34 
Additionally, § 4822 sets out the requirements for housing that re-
ceives federal assistance, and requires the Secretary of HUD to establish 
procedures to eradicate the hazards of lead based paint poisoning in any 
housing that is either covered by an application for mortgage insurance or 
housing assistance payments under a program administered by the Secre-
tary, or receives over five thousand dollars in project-based assistance under 
a federal housing program.35 It further requires distribution of lead hazard 
information pamphlets to purchasers and tenants; periodic risk assessments; 
and inspections, reductions, and abatement of lead-based paint hazards.36 
The original United States Housing Act (“USHA”) was enacted in 
1937 and was later amended by the Quality Housing and Work Responsibil-
                                                                                                                           
 30 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LEAD-BASED PAINT 2, 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=20258_legislativehistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5UYN-H8XG]. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is now known as the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 4821(a) (2012). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. § 4821(b). The Consumer Product Safety Commission is tasked with protecting the public 
from injury or death associated with the use of consumer products. About CPSC, U.S. CONSUMER 
PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/About-CPSC/ [https://perma.cc/424C-Q2VD]. 
 35 42 U.S.C. § 4822(a)(1). 
 36 Id. § 4822(a)(1)(A)–(E). 
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ity Act of 1998 (“QHWRA”).37 The policy declaration of the USHA states 
that it exists to aid states in solving both the shortage of safe and suitable 
housing for low-income families as well as the unsafe housing conditions 
that are present.38 The QHWRA also goes on to state that our nation should 
promote and aim to provide “decent and affordable housing for all citi-
zens.”39 
Furthermore, the USHA, as amended by the QHWRA, also addresses 
low-income housing assistance, which aids low-income families in procur-
ing decent places to live and also promotes “economically mixed hous-
ing.”40 Specifically, the statute authorizes the Secretary to enter into annual 
contribution contracts with public housing agencies that can make assis-
tance payments to owners of existing dwelling units.41 If a particular area 
does not have a public housing agency, the Secretary may enter into con-
tracts to make assistance payments and otherwise perform the functions of a 
public housing agency.42 
The remainder of § 1437f provisions outline the required contents and 
purposes of the contribution contracts as well as the restrictions, required 
provisions and duration of the contracts.43 Additionally, § 1437d(f)(2) re-
quires that the Secretary establish housing quality standards and require-
ments to make sure that public housing units are safe.44 
Title 42 § 1983 of the United States Code provides legal redress for 
those who have had their constitutional or other legal rights violated.45 It 
purports to hold liable those persons who deprive United States citizens, or 
people within the jurisdiction of the United States, of their constitutional or 
                                                                                                                           
 37 United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1437–1437bbb-9 (2012)); Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2518 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 4168 (2012) and scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 38 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(A). 
 39 Id. § 1437(a)(4). 
 40 See id. § 1437f(a). Although § 1437f does not specifically define “economically mixed 
housing” the purpose of the USHA, as amended by the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility 
Act, is to integrate lower income individuals into the private rental market and prevent the isola-
tion of lower income individuals and families in large housing complexes. See Armen H. Merjian, 
Attempted Nullification: The Administrative Burden Defense in Source of Income Discrimination 
Cases, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 211, 214 (2015); Jenna Bernstein, Note, Section 8, Source 
of Income Discrimination, and Federal Preemption: Setting the Record Straight, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1407, 1407 (2010). 
 41 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1). 
 42 Id. § 1437f(b)(1). 
 43 See id. § 1437f. 
 44 Id. § 1437d(f)(2). 
 45 See id. § 1983. 
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other legal rights.46 Section 1983 gives a legal remedy for a person to bring 
an action if his or her constitutional or legal rights have been violated.47  
Case law illustrates whether certain statutes create viable legal rights 
for purposes of § 1983 actions.48 In Blessing v. Freestone, a group of five 
mothers whose children were eligible for state child support services under 
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the Di-
rector of the Arizona Department of Economic Security, the agency charged 
with providing such services.49 The mothers claimed that the agency did not 
take adequate steps to obtain child support payments from the fathers of 
their children.50 The United States Supreme Court identified three factors 
pertinent to determining if a statute confers a viable § 1983 action: (1) Con-
gress must have intended the provision to benefit the plaintiff; (2) the stat-
ute is not so “‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judi-
cial competence”; and (3) the provision imposes a binding obligation on the 
state, i.e., it must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.51 
Based on these factors, the Court held that Title IV-D did not give the 
mothers individually enforceable federal rights, and vacated the judgment 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, with instructions to remand to the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona.52 
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, a former Gonzaga University (“Gon-
zaga” or “the university”) student sued the school under § 1983.53 The stu-
dent wanted to become an elementary school teacher, and he needed an af-
fidavit from the university of good moral character.54 The teacher certifica-
tion specialist at Gonzaga overheard two students discussing allegations of 
sexual misconduct against the former student.55 The teacher certification 
specialist launched an investigation and ultimately informed the state agen-
cy for teacher certification of the allegations against the student.56 The 
teacher certification specialist also informed the student that he would not 
receive the affidavit of good moral character from the university.57 The stu-
dent alleged that the university violated the Family Educational Rights and 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id.; Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285–86 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 
U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997). 
 49 520 U.S. at 329, 332–33. 
 50 Id. at 337. 
 51 Id. at 340–41. 
 52 Id. at 349. 
 53 536 U.S. at 277. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
214 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 44:207 
Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, by releasing personal infor-
mation to an unauthorized person.58 
The Court held that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions created no per-
sonal rights under § 1983, reasoning that when Congress intends to create 
an enforceable right, the statute phrases the right in terms of the persons 
benefited.59 The Court determined that FERPA gives instructions about 
funding educational institutions, but does not have the language necessary 
to create an otherwise enforceable right.60 
Likewise, in Caswell v. City of Detroit Housing Commission, a recipi-
ent of housing subsidies from the City of Detroit Housing Commission 
(“the Housing Commission” or “the Commission”), brought a claim under 
§ 1983, arguing that the Housing Commission infringed upon his federal 
rights when the Commission terminated his housing subsidies before his 
eviction proceedings were final.61 The regulation at issue mandates that the 
housing authority continue making housing assistance payments to the 
owner until the owner is able to get a court judgment evicting the tenant.62 
The issue before the court examined whether regulations promulgated under 
a federal statute can create private rights for purposes of § 1983.63 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Caswell was bound by prior 
precedent from the United States Supreme Court, Gonzaga and Alexander v. 
Sandoval.64 Specifically, in Sandoval the Supreme Court found that regula-
tions themselves can invoke private rights of action created in statutes, but 
regulations on their own cannot create private rights of action.65 In particu-
lar, the court relied heavily on Sandoval quoting the Court’s precedent: 
“[l]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Con-
gress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Con-
gress has not . . . .”66 The plaintiff in Caswell could not point to a specific 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 277; see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). The Family Educational Rights 
Privacy Act prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the 
release of students’ education records without authorization. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; Gonzaga, 
536 U.S. at 276. 
 59 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283–84, 287 (“rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘inter-
ests,’ that may be enforced”). 
 60 See id. at 287. 
 61 418 F.3d 615, 616, 618 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 62 Id. at 618. Owner is defined as any person who has the legal right to lease or sublease a unit 
to a participant. 24 C.F.R. § 982.4 (2016). 
 63 418 F.3d at 618. 
 64 See Caswell, 418 F.3d at 619–20. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001); Caswell, 418 F.3d at 619–20. In Alexan-
der v. Sandoval, an individual applying for a driver’s license brought a class action suit against the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety, alleging discrimination arising out of the policy of giving 
driver’s license examinations only in English. 532 U.S. at 279. Sandoval brought the claim under 
a regulation promulgated through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids federal 
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statute that conferred the right he claimed and therefore his § 1983 claim 
failed.67 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Johnson v. City of Detroit, the Sixth Circuit held: (1) the Lead-
Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (“LBPPPA”) does not confer indi-
vidual rights enforceable in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) United 
States Housing Act (“USHA”) provisions did not create enforceable rights 
for purposes of a § 1983 action; and (3) regulations promulgated pursuant to 
the USHA could not create enforceable rights to sustain a claim under 
§ 1983.68  Focusing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzaga University 
v. Doe, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that 
the LBPPPA does not confer individual rights enforceable in a § 1983 ac-
tion because the statutory provisions of the LBPPPA do not contain “the 
sort of rights-creating language which reveals Congressional intent to create 
a federal right . . . .”69 Rather than focusing on giving tenants individual 
rights, the statute creates duties for the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”).70 Additionally, although the LBPPPA was enacted 
to benefit public housing tenants, the statutory language does not expressly 
create any individual rights.71 
In the same way that the Court found no rights-creating language in 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), the court in John-
son held that the USHA contains congressional policy declarations and re-
quirements of annual contribution contracts, rather than rights-creating lan-
guage.72 The court found that although the tenants benefit from the USHA, 
the statute focuses on the regulated entity, and does not create enforceable 
rights for the tenants.73 Based on Gonzaga, the tenants in Johnson could not 
bring the § 1983 action because the statute does not contain the rights-
creating language that is sufficient to bring a § 1983 claim.74 
Finally, the court held that the regulations promulgated pursuant to the 
LBPPPA and USHA could not create enforceable rights of their own accord 
                                                                                                                           
funding recipients from utilizing criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting 
individuals to discrimination. Id. at 278–79. The United States Supreme Court held that Title VI 
does not contain a private right of action to enforce regulations based on a theory of disparate 
impact. Id. at 293. 
 67 Id. at 620. 
 68 Johnson v. City of Detroit (Johnson II), 446 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 69 Id. at 623. 
 70 See id. at 624. 
 71 Id. at 624–25. 
 72 See Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002); Johnson II, 446 F.3d at 626. 
 73 Johnson II, 446 F.3d at 627. 
 74 See id. 
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under § 1983.75 The court cited the Sixth Circuit decision in Caswell v. City 
of Detroit Housing Commission, which concluded that because there was no 
specific statutory provision in the USHA that conferred a right relevant to 
the regulation regarding housing assistance payments, Caswell could not 
pursue his claim under § 1983.76 Even if a regulation contains rights-
creating language, a regulation alone cannot create a private right of action 
that was not first created through statutory text.77 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reached the 
correct decision based on the Gonzaga and Alexander v. Sandoval prece-
dents; however, Johnson demonstrates the negative impact that these deci-
sions can have on plaintiffs attempting to bring § 1983 claims in federal 
court.78 The court found that even though the USHA and LBPPPA benefit 
tenants of public housing, the “benefit” is not enough to create individual 
rights for the tenants to bring a claim under § 1983.79 The Gonzaga and 
Sandoval decisions drew a hard line between individuals who merely “bene-
fitted” from the statutes, and those who could actually bring a cause of ac-
tion.80 The decision to only allow § 1983 claims by individuals explicitly giv-
en an enforceable right under statute unnecessarily limits legal remedies, 
and excludes a power tool against government overreach, § 1983.81 Without 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. at 629. 
 76 Id. at 628–29. 
 77 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001). 
 78 Johnson II, 446 F.3d at 621; BERRY ET AL., supra note 16, at 85. The Alexander v. Sando-
val decision limits a plaintiff’s ability to bring discrimination claims based on disparate impact. 
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; BERRY ET AL., supra note 16 at 85; see also BRADFORD C. MANK, 
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPOR-
TIONATE RISKS 38 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“In light of both the 
Sandoval and [Gonzaga University v. Doe] decisions, most federal courts have held that [§ 1983] 
suits cannot be used to enforce . . . disparate impact regulations.”). 
 79 Johnson II, 446 F.3d at 624–25, 27; see Anne E. Melley, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Federal Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Hazard Reduction Statutes (42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 4801 to 4856), 47 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 95, 150 (2010). 
 80 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289; Johnson II, 446 F.3d at 619, 21. 
When viewed in the light of the Sandoval decision, civil rights advocates believe Gonzaga indicates 
“the Court’s intention to ‘substantially curb private lawsuits.’” BERRY ET AL., supra note 16, at 90; 
see Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289. Additionally, Justice Stevens, in the Gon-
zaga dissent, argued that the majority improperly inserted the test that is used in implied-right-of-
action cases into the § 1983 analysis. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 299–302 (Stevens, J. dissenting). The 
implied-right-of-action test that Justice Stevens refers to in his dissenting opinion looks to congres-
sional intent to determine whether Congress sought to establish a private remedy. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 
at 299–302 (Stevens, J. dissenting); see Bradford C. Mank, The Long-Term Implications of Gonzaga 
v. Doe, AM. BAR ASS’N HUMAN RIGHTS MAG., July 2014, at 2, 3, http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2015--vol--41-/vol--41--no--1---lurking-in-the-shadows-
-the-supreme-court-s-qui/the-long-term-implications-of-gonzaga-v--doe.html 
[https://perma.cc/TJU3-JUDY] (discussing Justice Steven’s dissent in Gonzaga).  
 81 See BERRY ET AL., supra note 16, at 94. The reaction is similar to the reaction that arose 
out of the court’s narrow reading of the Title VI in Sandoval, which some found goes against the 
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the ability to bring a claim under § 1983, Dellita Johnson, and other tenants 
like her, are limited in their means to achieve justice: she was unable to hold 
the City and the Housing Commission accountable in federal court for their 
asserted role in her son’s illness.82 
Although public housing tenants cannot bring § 1983 claims alleging 
violations of LBPPPA and USHA, plaintiffs who have suffered from lead-
based paint poisoning can bring state common law and statutory claims.83 
Plaintiffs should consider causes of action such as environmental toxic tort, 
common law negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, breach of cove-
nant to repair, and/or breach of implied warranty of habitability.84 Although 
state claims are an option for plaintiffs, courts’ interpretation of these claims 
vary from state to state and do not provide a uniform level of protection for 
                                                                                                                           
inclusive spirit of the civil rights legislation. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; BERRY ET AL., supra note 
16, at 85. “The Court’s prohibition of this implied private right of action to enforce regulations 
promulgated under § 602 bars civil rights and environmental justice plaintiffs from enforcing their 
disparate impact discrimination claims.” BERRY ET AL., supra note 16, at 85. Such a narrow read-
ing of the statutes, limiting the claims that can be brought under both § 1983 and agency regulations 
causes plaintiffs to increasingly rely on administrative remedies, instead of bringing claims in court 
to obtain relief from violations of the statute. See id. at 76. 
 82 See Johnson, 446 F.3d at 617; see also BERRY ET AL., supra note 16, at 94. A heightened 
§ 1983 standard can have serious consequences for many civil rights and environmental justice 
groups that have turned to federal courts to enforce their rights. BERRY ET AL., supra note 16, at 
94; see Mank, supra note 80, at 3. Scholars have argued that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion in Gonzaga diminished civil liberties because it hindered the right to enforce federal statu-
tory rights under § 1983’s explicit provision for enforcement of statutory rights. Mank, supra note 
80, at 3. The decision lessened the distinction between rights and remedies, which essentially 
caused a shifting of the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff when having to show 
that § 1983 can be used to impose a remedy for a deprivation of a federal statutory right. Id. 
 83 See, e.g., Rochkind v. Finch, 9 A.3d 88, 91 (Md. 2010) (bringing negligence claim against 
landlord, landlord’s sole shareholder, and property manager); Colon v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 630 
N.Y.S. 2d 218, 220 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (bringing negligence claim against landlord); Chase v. Pistolese, 
739 N.Y.S. 2d 250, 253 (City Ct. 2002) (bringing breach of implied warranty of habitability claim 
against landlord); see also Kyle W. La Londe, Who Wants to Be an Environmental Advocate?: Op-
tions for Bringing an Environmental Justice Complaint in the Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval, 31 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 27, 34–35 (2004) (introducing alternative options for bringing envi-
ronmental justice claims after Sandoval). Ms. Johnson did bring various state common law and 
statutory claims, but the District Court declined to extend their supplemental jurisdiction and dis-
missed the state claims without prejudice. Johnson v. City of Detroit, 319 F. Supp. 2d 756, 781 
(E.D. Mich. 2004). Ms. Johnson then brought those same claims in Michigan state court. Johnson 
v. City of Detroit, No. 264125, 2006 WL 3019425, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006). She was 
unable to recover in state court under the negligence and breach of contract claims because she 
failed to meet the statutory notice requirements. Id. at *4–5. She was also unable to recover for the 
negligence per se claim because the defendants had governmental immunity. Id. at *1. 
 84 See, e.g., Rochkind, 9 A.3d at 91 (bringing negligence claim against landlord, landlord’s 
sole shareholder, and property manager); Colon, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 220 (bringing negligence claim 
against landlord); Chase, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 253 (bringing breach of implied warranty of habitability 
claim against landlord). 
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public housing tenants.85 The court in Johnson had an opportunity to reme-
dy this lack of uniformity and to protect future public housing tenants, but 
the court was bound by the harsh precedent of Gonzaga that left the court 
unable to remedy the injustice suffered by Johnson and similarly situated 
public housing tenants.86 
CONCLUSION 
Johnson v. City of Detroit is a result of the precedent set in both Gon-
zaga University v. Doe and Alexander v. Sandoval, which has limited the 
ability of plaintiffs to bring claims under § 1983. As Ms. Johnson experi-
enced, a plaintiff’s ability to recover in federal court for lead poisoning 
caused by lead paint in his or her living unit is severely limited by these 
decisions. Plaintiffs like her will not be able to achieve justice through the 
federal court system that they would have otherwise been able to achieve. 
Jerome Johnson and his mother did not receive justice for the preventable 
damage, specifically Jerome’s painful and disabling bodily injuries that 
have necessitated medical care, the behavioral difficulties, and the irreversi-
ble brain damage that he has suffered. 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Compare Childs v. Purll, 882 A.2d 227, 233–34 (D.C. 2005) (entering summary judgment 
for landlord, management company, and company’s principals finding that they had no actual or 
constructive knowledge that the lead paint was painting, peeling or flaking even though there was 
evidence that the management company and its principals occasionally inspected apartment when 
paint may have been peeling and chipping), with Bencosme v. Kokoras, 507 N.E.2d 748, 750 
(Mass. 1987) (holding the landlord strictly liable under state’s lead paint poisoning prevention 
statute finding statute imposed liability on landlord for the children’s injuries even without finding 
that the owner had knowledge or received notice of the lead paint). In addition, governmental 
immunity and notice provisions could also limit a plaintiff’s recovery in state court as they did for 
Ms. Johnson. See Johnson, 2006 WL 3019425, at *1. 
 86 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; BERRY ET AL., supra note 16, at 93–94. 
